


k 


^^^H^A Critical Examination [in 


HHPk- part] of Pennypacker^s Life 




of General George G. 


■ ■ ■ 


Meade 




BY 




HENRY H. HUMPHREYS, 




A. dc C. 


: 


HIGHLAND PARK, 




Lake County, - - Illinois. 


' 


TIVOLI, N. Y., 


■ 


FRANK 0. GREEN, 


r 


1901. 



Dana on Meade and Humphreys. 

•The Niiitli Corps was moved by rail to Annapolis, where it was reoruited 
up to about twenty-five thousand men. As the time for action neared it was 
set in motion, and bj' easy marches reached and re-enforced the Army of the 
Potomac on the morning of. the 6th of May, in the midst of the battle of the 
Wilderness. It was not formally incorporated with that army imtil later, but, 
by a sort of Action, it was held to be a distinct army, Burnside acting in concert 
with Meade, and receiving Iiis orders directly from Grant, as did Meade. These 
two armies were the exruse for- CIraiit's jx'rsonil ]trespnne. wiMimit ;i(>f imllv 
superseding Meade. 

'•In my opinion tiie great soldier of the Army of the Putoindv <ii lui.-. ihm.- >. .t> 
General Humiihreys. He was the chief of staff to General Meade and was a 
strategist, a tactician, and an engineer. Humphreys was a fighter, too, and in 
this an exception to most engineers. He was a very interesting figure. He 
used to ride about in a black felt hat. tlie brim of which was turned down 
all around, making him look like a (Quaker. He was very pleasing to deal with, 
unless you were fighting against him, and then he was not so pleasant. [He 
was a Quaker by descent.] * * * * •* * * * * Hum- 
phreys was a very charming m^n, quite destitute of vanity. I think he had 
consented to go and serve with Meade as chief of staff out of pure patriotism. 
He preferred an active command, and eventually on the eve of the end, succeeded 
to the command of the [combined] Second [Tliird] Corps, and bore a conspicuous 
part in the Appomatox campaign. — Cliarles A. Dana's Recollections page 191-2. 

■Before the army had recovei'ed from its long march from Cold Harbor and the 
failure to cajiture [Petersburg] there was an unusual amount of controversy going 
on among the officers. Meade and Warren were so at loggerheads that Meade 
notified Warren that he must eitlier ask to be relieved as corps-commander or 
he (Meade) wouhl i)refer charges against him. It seemed as if Meade grew more 
unpopular every day. Finally the difficulties between him and his subordinates 
became so serious that a cliange in the commander of tlie Army of the Potomac 
seemed iirobable. *•;«■** Page 220 

•'The Fiftii Corps having pre]mred the way. tiie whole army left the line.s about 
Cold Harbor on schedule tinte, just as soon after nightfall on the 12tli [June 
18G4] as its movements could be concealed from the olxservation of the enemy. 
It was in drawing orders for such complicated movements as these, along dif- 
ferent roads and by different crossings, that the ability of General Humplireys. 
the chief of staff,' was displayed. Everything went perfectly from the start". 
Page 218 

"I had long known Meade to be a man of the worst possible tamper, especially 
toward his subordinates. I think lie liad not a friend m tlie vvliole army. No 
man, no matter what his business or his .service, approached him without being 
insulted in one way or another, and his own staff officers did not dare to speak 
to him unless first spoken to. for fear of either sneers or curses. Tlie latter 
however. I had never heard him indulge in very violently, but he was said to 
apply them often without occasion, and without reason. At the same lime, as 
far as I was able to ascertain, his generals had lost their confideiKie in him as a 
commander. His orders for the last series of assaults upon Petersburg, in wliich 
we lost ten thousand men without gaining any decisive ailvantage, were greatly 
(n-itici.sed. They were, in effect, tiiat he had found it impractible to secure tlie 
co-operation of corps-commanders, and that, therefore, each one was to attack 
on his own account and do the best he could by himself. The < onsequence \\ a 

f'oiif/iiit('<f ov Fiimili of T.itil: ('(tri'r. 



f 




A Critical Examination [in 
part] of Pennypacker^s Life 
of General George G. 
Meade 

BY 

HENRY H. HUMPHREYS, 
A. de C 

HIGHLAND PARK, 
Lake County, - - Illinois. 



TIVOLI, N. Y., 
FRANK O. GREEN, 

1901. 



have sent them flying irom tlie field, converting the retreat into a {lis-organized 
mass of flying fugitives. Had a force been sent to tlie Cashtown Pass, that of 
Fairfield would have been opened at once, we sliould have liad some rear guard 
actions, and would have arrived upon the grouiul at Willianisport just as soon as 
Lee. 

How often this has been performed in past ages it is needless to point out, 
and we are of tlie belief sucli were the views of the Chief of Staff, though he 
records this affair in cautious language. See '"Gettysburg to the Rapidan'*, p. 3 
& 7. The Nation held and still holds Gen'l Meade responsible for this failure, 
and no glossing over it, or meretricious treatment, can or will absolve him from 
that glaring error. 

Gettysburg, the reconnaissance to the Fairfield Pass, the flank movement or 
march to Willianisport, Md., had by that time determined the personal equation 
of each of the several Corps commanders; of this fact the Commanding General 
must have been aware; still, in deference to the opinion of all (except two com- 
manders), tiie attack was put off until a better oi)inion could he formed of the 
strength of the enemy's works. 

"Councils of War never fight"; the personal e(iuation is also a prominent fac- 
tor; it remained with but one man to say whether the army should fight or not; 
neither do we find the views of his Chief of Staff expressed at that meeting, 
though we are of the opinion that he was not averse to a trial of strength. 

Both armies occupied good positions; that of the Confederates covered ground 
of about ten miles naturally strong. Their flanks could not be turned; the ground 
from their left to near their right centre presented difficult topographical feat- 
ures to an attacking force; towards their right and right centre the ground wa*^ 
more open: though strong, it was more favorable for attacking: we should have 
lost many men in so doing, but had the attack been successful our enemy would 
have been cut in two, both roads leading to the fords of the Potomac would have 
been in our possession, also their army. 

The strength of both armies was nearly equal. On the supposition that at 
that time it required about five thousand men to hold a front of one mile of rifle- 
pits, the Confederates had but very few men for a reserve force: that foice could 
not have been larger than ten thousand. On our part, our line of rifle-pits being 
less in length than those of the enemy, we could have spared for the assault at 
least twenty-five thousand men. 

The only ground which ^sas at all favorable for an attack was opposite our 
left; though some features of it were unfavorable, thev were not insurmount- 
able. We refer to that portion which is crossed by the Willianisport road, not 
the pike. 

This ground could not have escaped the eyes of the Commanding General, and 
did not escape those of his Chief of Staff; and very likely it had been selected as 
the point to deliver the assault on the morning of July 14th, 1803. when moving- 
forward that morning we found the enemy liad crossed the Potomac. 

The Administration was anxious the invaders should be driven from Northern 
soil, was in fact willing to stand sponsor for failure should it take place, and our 
people would have supported the attempt, and submitted without a murmur had 
we suffered a defeat. 

We are compelled to record our opinion tliat the Commanding General of 
Willianisport is not the one of Gettysburg. 

When Gen. Humphreys gave testimony before the Committee on the Conduct 



of the War, his evidence was the consensus of that of the Army; a direct question 
would have elicited the answer sought; ordinarily more was kept back than 
was uttered. 

Those who have read "The Life" understand the movements of both armies 
after Marj'^land was evacuated; but we have something to say regarding the 
movements of the 3rd Corps when before and in Manassas Gap, backed by two 
other Corps of the Army of the Potomac. 

Had such dilatory movements, (those of tlie 3rd Corps of the Union Army) 
occurred in an European force, the Commander of that unit which had been 
guilt}' of such an action would have been brought before a court, tried, found 
guilty aiid shot. 

Though the actions of the Commander of the 3rd (Jorps ruined the carefully 
planned projects of the chief of Staff for striking Lee with the units of his armj' 
disjointed, the generosity of the Commander of the Army of the Potomac inter- 
ferred with the meting out to him of his just rewards, due to his incompetency, 
and he was still permitted to command his Corps. 

At that time the Gap (Manassas) was filled with blackberi-ies, which were par- 
taken of by the troops left by Lee to hold the Gap until his army had passed, 
without their giving any attention to the Union troops, and when their bellies 
could hold no more of that fruit they withdrew, leaving to our forces such of 
the berries as they could not carry away. 

We are compelled to remark again, that with this exiiibition of generosity on 
the part of the (Commanding General, he must assume the whole responsibility of 
the failure to strike Lee while in march, and the onus cannot be put on anyone 
else's shoulders. He had his remedy, but failed to use it. 

Light may be thrown upon the relations which existed between tne Command- 
ing General and the 3rd Corp Commander, wherein the latter advises the former 
how to obtain information of the enemy. See Serial No. 45, p. 6G7, "Official Re- 
cords of the Rebellion". 

Tliere was at the Hd. Qrs. of the Army of the Potomac a Provost Marshal 
General whose duties were to find out just this information, while other Corps 
Commanders could have given some, but so far as the Official Records go they fail 
to show it. 

There were other means of obtaining information, such as forcing our enemy 
to display his line of battle by a show of force on our part suflficient to cause 
him to display his strength, etc. 

We also perceive the magnanimous treatment of this officer's conduct by the 
author of '-Gettysburg to the Rapidan", in his failui-e to comprehend what 
was required of liim to produce results, rendering abortive those peerless 
projects in Logistics and Strategy of the Chief of Staff of the Army of the 
Potomac. 

Regarding the curious facts that both Commanding Generals had submitted 
their resignations to their respective governments, and the remarks of General 
Fitzhugh Lee upon tiiat of Lee's "that the removal of Meade would have been an 
act of kindness to the Confederates"', we agree with him, for had Meade's request 
been granted, his eminent Chief of Staff would have also been relieved, and the 
Confederate Army would then have had no difficulty in understanding the 
mov^ements of the Army of the Potomac. See pages 5 and 222 of the ''Life". 

By adopting "the unfortunate misapprehension" of his rear-guard commanders 
as to the presence of Lee's army at Culpepper Court House, Meade placed his 



whole armj' in a clisadvantag;eous position so far as fighting was concerned, and 
jeopardized Washington, and this in the face of tlie advice of liis Chief of Staff, 
who saw clearly what was the purport of the niovonient on the i)art of Lee. 

Just here we must admit upon the scene an aside which has more or less bear- 
ing upon the subject. 

During the disc^ussion as to what the movement of Lee meant, the Chief of 
Staff in a very lucid manner explained the whole movement to the Commanding 
General of tlie Army of the Potomac who, carried away in his belief that Lee 
intended to give him battle at Culpepper, endeavored to bully the Chief of Staff 
into the same belief; some words were said bv iMeade, to which no reply was 
made, the Chief of Staff simply rising from ids seat on the opposite side of tlie 
table and looking his Chief steadily in the eyes when he abruptly left the tent. 

This was the first and only attempt at bullying his Chief of Staff, and IMeade 
ever afterwards listened and heeded the advice given him. 

We have furthermore to add that the advice given and not heeded by Meade was 
confirmed that night by advices received from the cavalry, who had failed to 
transmit as required by orders information of the crossing of the Confederate 
Army on the upper Rappahannock near Sulphur Springs. 

Our cavalry were not placed there for fighting, but for the purpose of observ- 
ing and giving information of the presence of Lee as soon as possible: this officer 
violated his instructions, placing our army in a dangerous position; he should 
have been arrested, brought before a Drum Head Court Martial, tried and shot. 

Had the Chief of Staff' the command of that armv. such would have been his 
fate. 

News of the presence of Confederates at the Sulphur Springs, was brought to 
Hd. Qrs. by Lieut. Nicolas Nolan of the Gth U. S. Cavalry, who was shot in the arm 
whilst cutting his way through a party of the enemy's cavalry, which endeavoreil 
to capture him, but escaped, thajiks to the speed of his horse. 

Fortune favored us there; had her face been turned away, another story would 
have been told, and the sun for Meade would have set forever. 

With the news that our right flank had been turned, that Lee was nearer to 
Washington than we. with our army partly on the right bank of the Rappahannock 
and distant some miles from the other portion, thougli witiiin supporting dis- 
tance, the momentous question for Meade was how to extricate himself from this 
unfortunate blunder. 

The matter was handed to his Chief of Staff, who looking over carefully the 
situation, devised the scheme whereby the army was rescued from its tlien peril- 
ous position. Ceaseless marching was of first importance, day as well as night; 
this the army yielded to, knowing well the situation, and legs won; with(mt tiiem 
we should have lost. 

During this extraordinary march of over :;() hours, the Corps Commanders rode 
in rear of their commands, ready to crush any force which might try to iini)ede 
their progress; close communications were kept between them, (the Corjis 
which was ahead and the Corps which followed); in one instance only was this 
close union between tliein broken, which will now be related. 

"An army crawls upon its belly;"" but in this case, legs were used in addition 
to the belly; most of our army had passed Bristoe Station, and over Broad Run. 
and were well on their way to Centreville, Va., leaving behind three corps and 
the Cavalry. These Corps were from the rear— the Cavalry, then the second Corps, 
mustering 8000 men: this force formed the rear guard: but in the action i'ought 



at or near Bristoe but 3000 men were engaged, tlie balance having been detached 
as an escort to the train: beyond Broad Run and on the road to Centreville, was 
the 5th Corps, then the Brd Corps. 

It was surmised that some force of tlie enemy would make its appearance at 
Bristoe; for this reason, the 5th Corps was directed not to move until the 2nd 
Corps came up, the 3rd not to march until the 5th began to move. 

By this arrangement it v/as expected to have three Corps ready to meet and 
crush any body of the enemy which should make its appearance at that place. 

Gen'l Warren was informed of these oiders, and direc;ted to move as rapidly as 
as possible, and also of the probability of a force of the enemy coming down 
from tlie Warrenton Road to Bristoe. 

As soon as the head of the ^nd Corps came in sight the 5th began to niarch, and 
upon its moving forward the 3rd mai-ched, abandoning the 2nd to its fate. 

To the soldier the booming of cannon and the sharp rattle of musketry is his 
very life and inspiration, but here we find two Corps marching from the field of 
battle, disobeying their orders and committing an offense which for a soldier 
merits the severest punishment under the Articles of War. 

The Commanding General, upon learning that these Corps were not in con- 
nection witii the 2nd, ordered them back, the head of the 5th reaching the 2nd at 
dusk; the Commander of that Corps having sometime before requested assistance. 

It was however too late to concentrate our army for a general engagement. 
The 2nd Corps had been attacked by an overwhelming force, but held its ground, 
and when night fell withdrew, not de^'eated, but victorious. Lee had not moved 
as quickly as we. 

Had these orders been obeyed by the Commanders of the 5th and 3rd Corps, 
we should and must have smashed in detail not only Hill's Corps but Ewell's 
also, as it was sometime before the latter arrived upon the ground, and after Hill 
had been engaged w-ith the 2nd. Neither would it have been necessary to put in 
that foot note which is found at the bottom of pages 20 and 21 of "Gettysburg 
to the Rapidan," and the remarks comprised in the last part on page 36. 

Thus was ruined an excellent plan which would have caught Lee when he was 
not expecting a fight. Fortune favored us, but we declined to partake of her 
favors; rebuffed as she had been, she continued to show us the way, but un- 
fortunately we had \vitli us men who were worse than nothing, and the Com- 
manding General, so far as we have been able to discover, did not take steps to rid 
himself of incubuses who could not comprehend that which was plainly written 
for their guidance: he is therefor to blame, and more than his agents, for not 
assuming that responsibilitj' which it was his plain duty to exercise. 

Why was not the Gettysburg order applied to these Commanders? The cause 
of the Union was imperilled by their retention. We do not perceive any differ- 
ence in the cases. See foot note on page 148 of the "Life''. 

And how must the Chief of Staff have felt when he saw the results of his 
careful work set aside as so much waste paper, work which caused much 
thought and care! Did he repine? No, not at all. but set to work with the same 
vigor, and devised other plans which were ruined by men intrusted with large 
commands. Is it any wonder that Lee was puzzled by the movements of Meade? 
No not his, but those of his Chief of Staff? 

The putting together of a complicated machine, all its parts turned to a nicety, 
involves a thorough knowledge of what it shall accomplish: smoothness of work- 
ing is essential to complete success. As the operations above described required 



nicety of adjustment to prevent friction, it lias been with us a matter of wonder 
wh}' representatives of the Commanding General were not present with the 5th 
and 3rd Corps, armed with authority to compel compliance with the orders, 
which would have insured harmonious working. 

One of these Corps Commanders had previously developed a weakness which 
had ruined one project, and here is another one afflicted with the same disease. 

Tonics are administered to give strength to a weak memi)er of tiie machine, 
and the symptoms of a break down aie recognized long before its appearance: 
hence we fail to apjjreciate the "shaking objects of a rage so magnilicent that it 
seemed capable of moving mountains."' 

The collapse has occurred; tonics are now of no avail, their administration but 
aggravating instead of strengthening, 

Lee retires to the Rappahannock, and takes up a position upon tiie west bank 
of that river, his right resting at Kelly's ford, his left at Bealton. holdinga bridge 
head upon the left bank and constructing cantonments for his ai'my. The army of 
the Potomac advances; the 5th and 6th Corps form the right of our army, the 1st, 
2nd and iJrd Corps the left, numbering about ;W,000 men. Opposing them were 
two divisions of Confederate troops of about 10.000 all told. At this ford (Kelly's) 
was an intrenched picket post held l)v some oOO men; we ford, attack this post 
with one brigade of troops and capture it. killing, wounding, and taking prison- 
ers 800 in all, but fail to capture the high ground in rear, and move forward and 
towards Brandy Station as directed in the orders. 

Oh that we had there some Roman or Napoleonic Commander to show our Gen- 
erals how to ford a river, not by a brigade but by divisions, and once across how 
to push forv.aid and engage our foe. not allowing him to slip through our fingers 
as Lee of did that night! "Ye Gods and little fishes!" what a pother about the 
capture 300 men by oO, 000, when more could have l)een gathered in by a more 
skillful fisher! 

A "tool" which has lost its edge is sent to the repair shop and inspected: if 
worth the trouble it is honed, if not it is thrown aside as worthless. Of such a 
character was the (Commander of the 3rd Corps that no ai^iount of honing could 
make his edge hold for any length of time, though possibly a re}n-esentative of the 
Commanding General sent to him and i-emaming there, when the o])erations of 
the Campaign began, might have produced better re.su Its by constant association 
with the oil stone; but this does not appear to have been done. 

He had failed in two important operations of the army and ruined combina- 
tions of a profound character, was still with the army, held command of one 
unit which was composed of as good material as any in the army, and he should 
not have been permitted to nullify its character. 

Officers of high rank are assigned to the command of C(n-})s by order of the 
President of the United States, and he alone can relieve them of that command. 
unless they are entirely unfitted for it. Politicians sometimes prevent such a 
relief; but if the facts are represented forcibly without malice, the order of the 
Commanding General will hold, and the ofilcer"s connection with Ihe army is 
severed, forever. The good of the country is sought, not revenge. 

Such drastic measures had once been applied to certain officers of o\tr army, 
and the action of the General approved by the highest authority in our land. 
The same action could have been applied in this case but was rot Tiie question 
will arise in the minds of all candid readers who was most to blame in the cam- 
l)aign of '-Mine Run", the General, or one of his agents. The "love" of his Corps 

8 



Commander in tliis ease ruined tlie General. 

Time and space are the two elements which enter into the calciilalions of the 
marches of an armj\ These must be known to the utmost nicety. Topographical 
features must be grasped — whether the country is hilly or flat, the nature of the 
soil, ravines, water courses, width of roads, bridges, good condition or not, 
.streams, wood, water, and grass, fords, depth of same, velocity of streams, 
nature of bottom, whether sandy, muddy, or rocky, height of banks of the 
streams. 

This being acquired, then comes the depth which each of the several arms of 
the service will occupy, from the head of column to the rear. 

In an army there are but very, very few men who, knowing all of the above, 
are miable to work out correctly just how long it will take an army to reach 
a certain place, starting from a given point and moving a certain number of miles 
an hour including halts. 

Let there be taken for the sake of illustration the space which is occupied by 
a footman, a mounted man; and a gun horsed bj' six horses. 

When in line, a footman occupies a frontage of 30 inches, and a pace is equal 
to 30 inches. A Company of infantry is now 104 strong; wlien in double rank 
it pre.sents a front of 52 men; therefore the frontage occupied by a company will 
be 52 multiplied by 30, and will equal 1560 inches. 
I Tw^cmaXi^ a Battalion is composed of four companies, with intervals of 90 inches between 
companies, of which there are three, equal to 270 inches, therefore the frontage 
will be 1560 multiplied by 4. plus 270 inches; equal to 6510 inches. 
U~(jik„JUk ^ Regiment is composed of three battalions of four companies each, with intervals 
of 24 paces between battalions, of wiiieh there are two, equal to 1440 inches. The 
Sergt Major is posted on the left of the regt, at an interval of six paces, equal 
to 180 inches: the Band is posted 24 paces from the right of the regt. and oc- 
cupies a front of 34 paces; 24 paces standing to its right is the Colonel; color 
IMrty, 4 men multiplied by 30 inches, equals 120 inches.; therefore the frontage 
of a regt wall be 6510 multiplied by 3, plus 1440, plus 180, plus 720, plus 720. plus 
720, plus 120, which equals 23,430 inches or 651 yds. 

With brigades composed of 3 Regts. of 3 batts. each, with intervals of 60 paces 
between regts. of which there are two. the frontage will be 651 yds. multipliedby 3 
plus 100 yds. which equals 2053 yds. 

With divisions composed of 3 brigades, of 3 regts. each, with intervals of 100 yds. 
between brigades, the frontage, 2053, multiplied by 3, plus 200 yds. equals 6259 yds. 

Corps composed of three divisions of 3 brigades each with two intervals of 100 
yds. each, givesa frontage 6259, which multiplied bv 3 plus 200 yds. equals 18977 
yds. 

In ths Artillery for a Corps, composed of 6 batteries of six guns each with cais- 
sons, battery wagons and forges, each gun horsed by six horses, each gun, caisson, 
battery wagon and forge is allowed 15 yds in depth; between muzzle of gun and 
horses following 4 yds. are allowed; therefore the frontage of a battery will be 
14 multiplied by 15 yds. plus 13 intervals of 4 yds., which equals 276 yds ; and six 
batteries will occupy a distance of 276 yds. multiplied by 6, plus 5 intervals of 28 
anil one-half yds., plus 28 and one half yards between the head and rear of the 
different arms of the service, equal to 1855 and one half yds. 

In a Regiment of Cavalry composed of 3 squadrons of 4 troops each, each troop 
consisting of 80 men, the intervals between troops are 6 yds., and between squad- 
rons of »-hi^'' there are two. 12 yds., giving a frontage of 320 yds. multiplieil by 3 



plus m yds. plus 24 yds. which equals 105(1 yds. 

The depth of a Corps composed of tlie three arms of the service is equal to 18977 
yds. for infantry, plus 1855/ yds. for artdlery, plus 1050 yds. for cavalry, with in- 
tervals of 28 and one half yds. between infantry and cavalry, agrand total of 21989 
yds., or 12 and 46 one-hundredth miles, while with an advance guard. 3000 yds. 
must be added. 

To the foregoing must be added a pontoon train, ambulances and medical wag- 
ons with the necessary stores to alleviate the sufferings of the many woimded, 
and ammunition carts whicli carry some of the reserve supply. 

An army, to compete witli its enemy, must and probably will consist of more 
tlian one Corps; when we grasp tlie vast number of the men wlio compose it, and of 
its impedimenta, whicli must accompany it, carrying forage, food, tents, medical 
supplies, and anununition, we can comprehend tlie magnitude of the operation, 
and wonder how such a machine does its work witliout hitches. 

On the 4th of May, 1864, tlie Army of the Potomac, over 100.000 strong, built 
over and crossed the Rapidan by five bridges, and marched a distance of over 20 
miles the same day, and this in the face of an active, well appointed, and ably 
commanded army. 

Its train of over 4000 wagons, if placed one behind the other, would cover over 
3G miles. 

Such work requires a brain of no ordinary character, and this was that of the 
Chief of Staff. We make no comment, but ask those who read to reflect upon 
this matter, which has been compressed in a few lines. 

To show the immensity of such an undertaking we submit the following to 
prove what length of time must elapse before the last man moves, when a small 
command consisting of a battalion of infantry, one battery of artillery, one squad- 
ron of cavalry, is leaving its barracks, at the rate of march of 8 miles an hour 
including halts. 

A Batt. of Infantry equals 180 yds., a Battery of Artillery equals 276 yds., and a 
Squadron of Cavalry equals 338 yds., a total of 794 yds. At 3 miles an hour, each 
mile will take 20 minutes, each yd. will take 20 divided by 1760 yds. in a mile, 
equal to one eighty-eighth of a minute; 794 yds. divided by 88. gives 9 for an ans- 
wer; therefore 9 minutes must elapse before the last man leaves the barracks. 

Suppose this column deploys for action, the infantry forming on the left of the 
road, the artillery coming into action on the right of the road and in line with the 
infantry, the cavalry forming on the right of the artillery, the last two to move 
at a trot, after the infantry have left the road. 

The infantry before its last man has left the road must move ISO yds., which 
will take 2 and one twenty-tvi-o sixtieths of a minute. 

Now Cavalry in addition to moving over its own length must move over the 
distance occupied by the artillery in column of march, plus the interval 
between these arms, plus the frontage of the artillery in action, which distance 
will be as follows : — 

Length of battery in column 276 yds, interval between infantry and artillery 
28 and one half yds., frontage of battery in action 19 yds. multiplied by 5, which 
equals 95 yds. Interval between cavalry and artillery 28 and one half yds. Space oc- 
cupied by cavalry in march 338 yds., a total of 776 yds. before the last man is in 
line of battle. 

At a trot a horse covers 235 yds in a minute; therefore it will take the cavalry 
2 and twenty-six .sixtieths of a minute before they are in line of battle; re- 

10 



diicing fractions, we find tliat it Avill take tliis small force to march, and form 
line of battle, roughly about 14 and one half minutes. 

How accurate must be the calculation for an army, so that there shall be no 
interference one witii another! 

Tlie above computations were called forth by "The Life'", quoting from "Swin- 
ton's" remarks on this operation. "Mine Run'". See page 244. 245 of the "Life'". 

After the "Mine Run" affair, Lee disposed his army as follows: Hill's Corps 
near, and guarding the fords of the Rapidan, Ewell's at Orange Court House, 
Longstreet at Gordonsville, each of them a little more than a day's march from 
each other, thus presenting a fine opportunity for engaging each of thein sepa- 
rately wlien the weather was favorable. 

Durirg a winter some days present themselves when the weather is severe, 
freezing the roads and streams. Plans anticipating such conditions had been 
drawn up by tiie Chief of Staff, when this chance so eagerly w^aited for was 
ruined by the receipt of a telegram from Gen'l Butler at Fortress Monroe, asking 
the cooperation of the Army of the Potomac in futherance of his plan for the 
release of the prisoners of war held at Richmond, Va., Washington directing 
cooperation. Accordingly Sedgwick, then in command, made a demonstration in 
his front, all flank movements being impracticable by reason of weather and the 
roads, though before doing so a telegram was written by the Chief of Staff, and 
signed by Sedgwdck, which stated that "the demonstration might spoil the chan- 
ces for the future". See page 72, Gettysburg to the Rapidan. 

The demonstration at Morton's Ford proved that had the roads and weather 
been suitable for moving tlie army, a well arranged i^lan for surprising them at 
tlie ford and throwing a large force quickly over the river would have been suc- 
cessful; their intrenchments taken at this point and at Raccoon's Ford, would 
have been turned, and their army encountered in detail. See same authority p 74. 

Had the weather been freezing, the demonstration w-ould have been converted 
into a real one, and the Confederate Army beaten; but the query arises to whom 
should the credit of this victory belong: not to Sedgwick, for he was only tempo- 
rarily in command, and could have had no plans, for such are not made in a 
short time, and the permanent Commander was at that time absent. Would it be 
given to the Clnef of Staff, whose plans they were? And would the "Life" have 
devoted more than two lines to describing t!>is operation? 

Lee saw the point and corrected his position at once; the oppoitunity passed, 
and never presented itself again. 

We fail to see in what manner the Army of the Potomac gained in the "superi- 
ority of numbers." unless it be by the addition of the 9th Corps, whose strength 
was made up mostly by men who had just entered the service; old soldiers well 
know how much reliance can be placed in such troops. The mobility of the Army 
was lessened by the breaking up of two Corps, distributing them amongst the 
other three; for in the country (wooded) in which the army was then moving 
retarded marching resulted from the excessive strength of the Corps. 

Corps of less strength would have answered the purpo.se better, would have 
been more directly under the eyes of their Commanding Officers, and time w^ould 
havebeen gained in tlie receipt of orders, while the time in making connection, 
each with the other, would have been shortened. 

The Chief of Staff of the Army of the Potomac was in favor of small units, and 
gives his reasons for such preference. See page 3 of the Virginia campaign of 
18G4 and fif). 

11 



As to the Corps cominander who "uinvittingly twice rohl)e(l Meade of victories 
through incompetence", and the '-advancement of Grant", we have this to say. 
Meade liad with liim not only the opportunity but the means to rid himself of 
tools which could not hold their edge, and failing to use them, cannot complain 
of the presence of tlie T.ieut. Gen'l in the field with the army which he, Meade, 
commanded. S-c«,yb«*-j*-i4o C| lA- "iC^ 

It is one of tlie J rinciplesof law, that no man can take advantage of his own 
wrong. Stfe pago :>(; ) of tho "Life ". 

We dissent from the views as expressed on page 2G2 of the "Life", of Meade 
surprising Lee on four different occasions: it was not he. but the admirable 
Chief of Staff of the Army of the Potomac, who surprised Lee on these occasions; 
his eyes saw farther into those matters tiian Meade's. The evidence exists in 
serial nos. 45, 48, 49, war of the Rebellion, official i-ecrQ^>-. and his dispatch i+h+ luuh. 
on file at the War Dept. U. S. A. ^ccu/v^ 

We now notice that for the first time the Chief of Staff's name is mentioned on 
page 260 of the "Life"; previous to this naming, any reader would have derived the 
impression that such an office was useless to the Commatider of the Army of tlie 
I'otomac, for on all the pages which have preceded no. 2G6 there is no mention 
oftliat name in that capacity. Tliis could not have been an oversight cm the 
part of the Biographer, but has arisen from his desire to put forward tlie claims 
of his man in stronger light, but as we have said above 'it being determined to 
move by Lee's right flank. Humphreys. Meade's Chief of Staff was requested by 
Meade to prepare a project for the movement. Humphreys sketched two plans, 
one of them turning Lee's right by the Catharpin and Pamunkey roads which 
was adopted, and in conformity with it Humphreys prepared the order". 

At this stage of this review of the "Life" we make this statement: all of those 
able movements previous to the arrival of the Lieut. Gen'l and his accompanying 
the Army of the Potomac in the field, were not the results of the biain of Meade 
but v.ere due to the brain of his Chief of Staff, and it was due to him 
that "during this whole period the Union army met with not a single reverse 
or disaster, althougli Lee tried against Meade's armor (not Meade's but Hum- 
phrey's) every si)ear tiiat he knew how to wield". See the Desi)atch Book. 

The writer of this review believes that when the history of that war is written. 
Humphreys' name will appear in letters of gold, and his great services in that 
great struggle will receive their reward. 

As to the battle of the Wilderness, we have this to say: Lee moved quicker 
than he did at Mine Run, and endeavored to strike us in flank, whilst in march 
his movement forced us to halt and fight. 

The orders from Ud. Qrs. of the Army of tlie Potomac dated May Ttn. lS(i4. at :{ 
P. M. for the Cavalry were as follows: '^13. Major General Sheridan commanding 
Cavalry Corps will have sufficient force on the approaches from the right to keep 
the Corps commanders advised in time of the approach of the enemy". See p. 42.'). 
appendix G, of the Virginia campaign 1SC4 and "(i.'j. 

Upon arrival at Todd's Tavern at midnight of the 7th of May. \>*fA, two divisions 
of Cavalry were found encamped there, and not where they should have been 
under the above quoted order. 

Duplicating the orders "with his own hand" were of no avail to us. for th.en 
the roads to Spottsylvania from our right were in tlie hands of the enemy, and 
this fact was known to the Chief of Staff, at the date of their lieing written and 
sent. 

12 



The "intelligent use" of the cavalry at that time was useless. We are not criti- 
cising an3'one in this reply but the writer of the "Life". Acknowledging that 
Cold Harbor was an itnportant point to the army "and on its extension on 
the left", it was of more importance to us for the contemplated crossing of the 
James River, as from that place roads lead, down to the points whicli had been 
selected for the crossing, and that was the reason why it was of such vast 
importance to ihe army. See page 307 of the "Life". 

On page 333 of the "Life" we are informed: "The details of the movement 
upon Petersburg from Cold Harbor had been elaborated by Meade and Hum- 
phreys, the two great masters of logistics m the Union armj^ with a cai'e that 
left notliing unprovided for". Now turn to page 201 of the Virginia Campaign 
of 1864 and 6o. and see what the Chief of Staff has to say upon this same subject. 

"In preparing the programme of tlie movement, it appeared to me (eqviivalent 
to the pronoun I) important that Gen'l Warren should move out the Long 
Bridge road, not onlj' far enough to cover the crossings of the Chickahominy by 
the army, but so far as to hold the bridge over the White Oak Swamp, and to look 
towards the three roads to Richmond already mentioned, which substantially 
met at Riddle's shop, about a mile in advance of the position General Warren 
was directed to take. 

"He could not well advance to Riddle's shop, since that would have exposed him 
to an attack in rear from White Oak Bridge. It was expected that such 
a movement by General Warren would deceive Lee, and give him the impres- 
sion tliat the Army of the Potomac was advancing upon Richmond, or if in- 
tending to cross the James, that it would do so near Malvern Hill, at City Point, 
or above. The movement made the desired impression upon him, and to a 
greater extent than was contemplated, for as we shall see farther on, he was 
uncertain what the Army of the Potomac was doing until tlie afternoon of the 
17th of June". 

At that time (the 17th of June, 1864) three Corps were at Petersburg, Va., and 
again on page 214, of tlie same work, we find the facts stated as follows for the 
16th of Jnue, same year: "At half past ten A. M. he (Lee)telegraphed Beauregard 
that he did not know the position of Grant's army, and coula not strip the north 
bank. At 3 P. M. he telegraphed he ha.l not heard of Grant's crossing James 
River. At that hour only the Sixth Corps and Wilson's cavalry remained on the 
north bank". 

We have convicted the writer of the "Life" of appropriating for his hero that 
which does not belong to him. But further, we find in Mc Clure's Magazine for 
the month of May, 1898, some reminiscences of (vliarles A. Dana, Ass't. Sec- 
retary of War who was witli Gen'l Grant. On page 35 of this magazine appears 
the following: 

"Tlie Fifth Corps having prepared the way, the whole army left the lines about 
Cold Harbor on schedule time, just as soon after nightfall on the 12th as its 
movements would be concealed from the observation of the enemy. It was in 
drawing orders for such complicated movements as these, along different roads 
and by diffei-ent crossings, that the ability of Gen'l Humphreys, the Chief of 
Staff was displayed. Everything went perfectly from the start". 

We again assert that it was the Chief of Staff's projects wliich were responsi- 
ble for the surprise of Lee on four occasions, viz. "Manassas Gap. Rappahannock 
Station. Mine Run, and the winter reconnoissance under Sedgewick'', and in 
this we are supported by the unanimous voices of all officers of the Army of the 

13 



Potomac, to wlioiu Humplire.vs was well known. 

These four examples just stated, the project for crossing the James River (elab- 
orating), and the forcible impression made upon Lee just related, together with 
the instructions prejiared for the assault upon Petersburg on the explosion of the 
mine, to be related further on, form brilliant examples in the art of Strategy. Lo- 
gistics and Tactic^:, stamping the author of them a consummate commander, and 
it has been said of him. "If fortune had favored him with independent command, 
it is certain that the country would have been the gainer"". See the memoir read 
before the National Academy of Sciences. April 24. 1885. page IL 

Respecting the mine at Petersburg, Va.. on page 880 of tiie "Life"" there is an en- 
comium bestowed upon the Commander of the Army of the Potomac by the Com- 
manding General of all the Armies of the United States. We quote it: "Meade's 
preliminary' orders were so exact as to cause Grant to say, at the later investiga- 
tion, that they could not be improved upon with all the light of subsequent results, 
and that if they had been obeyed Petersburg would have been captured"". 

Remembering what has been said of the Lieut. Gen'l by the writer of the "Life" 
we are surprised that his testimony should be brought forward to the support of 
Meade, but that our readers may know who was the author of the project for 
the assault after the explosion of the mine, they are referred to Appendix, page K 
429, of the Virginia Campaign of 1864 & (55. ^ 

The office of Chief of Staff was not a clerkship for the recording of the orders 
of the Coznmanding General of the Army of the Potomac, neither was it a fifth 
wheel. That office was distinct and separate, as has been clearly defined in this 
reph'. Were it clerical, that position would have been spurned by Gen'l 
Humphreys, whose high spirits and just regard for the rights of the office were 
well known to the army. 

We notice in readingthe "Life"" that whenever the Commanding General of the 
Army of the Potomac has need of assistance in maintaining his position, (accord- 
ing to the ideas of his Biographer) the Chief of Staff is brought forward in sup- 
port, thus proving his opinion as of great weight, though the readers of the "Life"' 
would not suspect his presence with that army, and his assistance to it. in the 
chapters which have preceded that numbered 18. 

We gratefully acknowledge the intended compliment, but declare in the .same 
breath that placing him merely upon the same platform cannot be entertained 
for one moment, of one who possessed such commanding abilities, not only in 
science and letters, but in that of the Art of War. 

Of the disaster which befell the 2nd Corps at Ream"s Station in August. "(54, we 
read on page 886 of the "Life"": "It was reported that the enemy was moving on 
the Halifax road, and Wilcox was ordered to use the Jerusalem Plank road, thus 
giving him a march of twelve miles"'. Now turn to page 280 of the Virginia 
Campaign of 18G4 & 05 and see what the Chief of Statf says of this movement: 
"But by the plank road his ( Wilcox"s) march was twelve miles long (about the 
same length as that of Mott"s troops), whereas had he gone by the railroad, which 
continued open until five o'clock, he would have had not more than five miles to 
march and would have got to Hancock by half past four or five, and managing 
his movement skillfully, might have taken a i)art of the enemy's force in Hank 
or rear". 

The Virgina Campaign of 1864 & 65 is the history of the labors of one man. re- 
lated in such language that one does not ])erceive that the atithor is telling his 
readers what part of the work he performed: but one who reads closely, can see 

14 



what he did, — a duty not of a brilliant character, because the work was of the 
closest character, but all the more arduous, in as much as each fact had to be 
given its full value before action could be taken, and when it was weighed, results 
followed of great benefit: nor was he absent from the field of battle in which he 
gloried; his fingers were upon the pulse of each great strviggle; and when he gave 
his opinion it was acted upon at once; never a mistake was made by him; we are 
therefore surprised at the ingenious manner in which the historian of the "Life" 
has turned this work to glorify tlie one man. 

If it be true as related on page 3 of the "introductory" to the "Life ' that the 
Commanding Gen'l could tell at any time of the night wlien firing occurred, ex- 
actly what troops were engaged, "and if occasion required, he made the dispo- 
sition of his army without needing to consult a map", then this acquirement, 
must have resulted from his association with his perfectly "poised" Chief of Staff, 
who possessed this peculiar gift to a degree remarkable, and this is the first time 
we are made aware some one else had it. We should certainly have heard of it 
from our connection with the Hd. Qrs. of the Army of the Potomac. 

We now return to page 5 of the "introductory" chapter which states as fol- 
lows: "In his address before the Society of the Army of the Potomac, June 12th 
1899, Courtlandt Parker quotes from a letter written by Gen"l Lee after the war 
as follows: 'Meade in ray judgement, had the greatest ability. I feared him 
more than any man I ever met upon the field of battle'. He also quotes Jeffer- 
son Davis as saying; 'My idea is that Meade was tlie most skillful general in 
the Fedei'al army. Gen'l Lee once said to me, that he could understand the 
movements of all the generals in the Federal army easier than those of Gen'l 
Meade'. In a letter to the present writer, dated January 31st, 1887, Mr. Davis 
said: 'I had a high opinion of and sincere regard for General Meade, both of 
which were manifested long before the war"'. 

If that which has just been quoted be true, there was good reason for it on 
the part of Lee, who might say it for the purpose of exalting his own ability, 
but whilst so doing, it is very probable, he was praising some one else infer- 
entially, the one we speak for. Alas he cannot do so now, but were he living the 
author of the "Life" would be required to take back very, very many of "tlie 
interpretations put upon such facts (for which) the autlior is alone responsible". 

Mr. Davis and Gen'l Humphreys were friends long before the Civil War: the 
former gentlemen liad the faculty of discovering men of ability, men who w^ould 
be willing horses, wlio would work, and no matter what was the amount required 
of them, would accept other matters equally as lieavy, requiring research, 
and the consuming of that delicate substance called "grey matter"; nor was Mr. 
Davis wrong in his selection of Gen'l Humphreys as such a man. 

We have the following from the lips of Gen'l Humphreys, who saw a letter 
written by Mr. Davis to a friend, this friend showing tiiat letter to the Gen- 
eral, who told of it to his very dear friend, Bvt. Major General John Watts De 
Peyster, of Tivoli, Duchess County, New York, who in a notice of the death of 
Gen'l Humphreys, published it amongst other matters pertaining to the General. 
This particular phrase can be found on page 5 of the pamphlet and reads: "On 
the other hand, one of the leaders of the Rebellion, in many respects its Arch 
magus, after the four successive changes in the command of the Army of the 
Potomac, observed: "They have not got the right man yet, and they never will 
have him until they appoint Andrew^ Atkinson Humphreys'"; again same page. 
"An officer in tlie Rebel Army, who occupied a very conspicuous position, a hard 

15 



military student, and well versed in military operations, remarks in substance, 
that 'while he looked upon Hancock as the best fighter in the Army of the 
Potomac, Humphreys was best fitted to command it"". "Humphreys" leadership 
and soldiership"', was the attest of a veteran observer, "were so unobtrusive that 
tlie country was not aware of what an able man it possessed in him." A Major 
General, himself very distinguished, experienced and esteemed, who occupied a 
position which gave him the amplest opportunities of judging, said that he "con- 
sidered Humphreys, take him all in all. the best General iu the Army of the Po- 
tomac, or the best fitted to command it." Another ofticer, whose peculiar, va- 
ried and constant service gave him vmusual advantages for judging and compar- 
ing, said a verj^ handsome thing of Humphreys: "For general as well as inti- 
mate acquaintance with the country in which he (Humphreys) was operating, 
and the troops against whom he was engaged, in fact, the general relative situa- 
ton of affairs. Humphreys was second to no other Union general."' Another 
gallant soldier remarks, "Take him all in all, soldiership, culture, science, gen- 
eralship, manners, lines of thought, social relations, dispositions, intention and 
energy, friendship and affection, he realized the words of another unfortunate, 
the poet, George Brookford. singing over the grave of a national hero. 
'The noble heart, the master mind, 
The chief that knew no fear. 
And leaves no warrior peer beliind. 

Lies sleeping soundly here. 
When riding "mid the battle's blaze, 

His eye with soul afire. 
The traitor foe stood still to gaze. 
And wonder and admire.'"" 
General Humphreys, (we cannot find a better expression than that stated on 
page 16 of the "Life") would have scorned "to have taken credit for another's 
work"; that "wasimposible to him"' and "unworthy of a soldier and a gentleman". 
It would have been far better had the curtain which has screened the lives of 
Gen'ls Meade and Humphreys remained down, but taking up exultingly tlie gage 
of battle wliicli has been cast before him, the writer performs a duty which is 
considered sacred. 

It is with deep regret that he is compelled to speak as he has done, for both 
were members of the same Corps, and friends of long standing. 

On November, 25th, 1864, Major General Humphreys was assigned to the com- 
mand of the 2nd Corps, a duty which was far more pleasant than the thankle.ss 
position of Chief of Staff to one who never did anything for him, yet relied 
upon him to pull the Commanding General out of a bad position. 

Henry H. Humphreys. 
Highland Park, Lake County, 111. 
July 3rd, 1901. 



l« 



Dana on Meaili and llun\phrfys, CoiitiiiKid. 

that each gained some advantage of position, but eacli exliausted liis own 
strengtJi in so doing; while for the want of a general pvirpose and a general 
commander to direct and concentrate the wliole, it all amounted to nothing 
biit heavy loss to ourselves. General Wright remarked confidentially to a friend 
that all of Meade's attacks had been made without brains and without general- 
sliip". — ''Recollections of tiie Civil War, with the Leaders at Washington and in 
the Field in the Sixties. By Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War from 
18r.3 to t.%.1. New York: D. Appleton and Company, 189!t, (pp. 226-27.) 



Aftermath. 

In regard to Meade's failure to attack Lee at Williamsport and Falling Waters 
there is one remarkable circumstance which does not seem to have ever appeared 
in print. The writer was on the most Intimate possible terms with many of our 
most notable Union generals, among tliese particularly with Major-Generals 
James B. Fry, Frovost-Marshal-General, and Abner D6ubleday. toth at Wash- 
ington after Gettysburg. They told him that when Meade was before Lee on 
the Potomac, tliey knew tliat Lincoln telegraphed to Meade "to attack Lee, 
liit or miss — that if he failed, to produce this telegram in extenuation of his failure 
and throw the whole bhune upon him, the President, and that if he were victo- 
rious to destroy the telegram and take all the glory to himself." That Lincoln 
did so was corroborated by a remark which he made to another friend, another 
Major-General, that "twice the Army of Northern Virginia had been delivered, 
horse, foot and dragoons, into the hands of the Army of the Potomac, and that 
lie was so disappointed, that if, he were tlie Disposer of Events, he did not know 
if he would do it a third time."' Tliese were not his exact words, which were 
so terse and emphatic, that it is most politic not to repeat them verbatim, 

Major-General George W. Culhun declared that the writer's memory was so 
trustworthy in his reports of conversations that the notes of a stenographer, 
taken down at the time, could not be more correct. And General Fry averred 
tliat the writer's report of a certain convex'sation was as perfect, some time 
afterward, as if he had written it down while it was occurring. Major-General 
A. A. Humphreys was tlie writer's dearest friend, and his criticisms are as 
jiatent to memory as if they had been stereotyped. The record of Dana in regard 
to Humphreys a)>peared in his published IMemoranda. In his published obitu- 
aries of Humphrey and of Meade, the writer's views of Meade's irresolution 
have been in print for many years, and therefore they cannot be charged as 
opinions apres coup. He has been all over a large portion of the ground between 
Jleade's headquarters and the Potomac, and considers that all the accidents of 
the fields of operations were in favor of the Army of the Potomac. General 
Doubleday declared that the River was "swimming" at the time — that is in 
full flooil with rapid current: yet, nevertheless, Lee svas enabled to escape with 
impunity. 

The writer would have added his information in full to the preceding pages, 
but he is far advanced in his 81st year, and broken with the consequences of 
two painful attacks and one terrible attack of the grippe, and therefore does 
not seek a controversy. But those who know him intimately will testify that 
liis memory was never more tenacious, and that his mind is as clear if not clearer 
than it ever was. These remarks are ijenned in justice to the memory/Tif 
Humphreys, than whom he never met a .superior as a soldier and general 1/any 
one respect, or a grander uTan: Plumphrey's only peer in his memory wa<^Iajor- 
General George H. Thomas, while the latters peer as an imposing spflrimen of 
mortality he never did meet in luiman form and magnanimity. i*-. ''^~^.. 

ANCHOR. (J, W. deP.)* 



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